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ABSTRACT
The paper provides a reconciliation of Lucas’ paradox, based on fixed setup costs of new
investments. With such costs, it does not pay a firm to make a “small” investment, even though such
an investment is called for by marginal productivity conditions. Using a sample of 45 developed and
developing countries we estimate jointly the participation equation (the decision whether to invest
at all) and the FDI flow equation (the decision how much to invest). We find that countries which
are more likely to serve as source for FDI exports than their characteristics project export lower flow
of FDI than is predicted by their characteristics. This negative correlation suggests that the source
countries with relatively low setup costs are also those with high marginal productivity of capital.
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In an inﬂuential paper, Lucas (1990) asks: “Why doesn’t capital ﬂow from rich to poor
countries?” Indeed, the law of diminishing returns implies that the marginal product of
capital is high in poor countries and low in rich countries. Therefore, capital should ﬂow
from rich to the poor countries.
With standard constant-returns-to-scale production functions, when the wage (per
eﬃciency units of labor) is higher in a rich country than in a poor country, then the
return to capital must be lower in the rich country than in the poor country. Therefore,
the existence of “huge” wage gap between rich and poor countries must be associated
with an opposite gap in the rates of return to capital. Given that labor is not allowed
to freely migrate from poor to rich countries, it follows that capital would ﬂow in the
opposite direction, thereby equaling the returns to capital and concomitantly wages too.
The equalization of wages (indirectly through international capital ﬂows) would eliminate
the need to control migration. In practice, however, this is hardly the case. Even though
barriers to international capital mobility are by and large being eliminated, the wage gap
is still in force, and migration quotas from poor to rich countries have to be enforced.1
Lucas reconciled this paradox by appealing to a human capital externality that gen-
erates a Hicks-neutral productivity advantage for rich countries over poor countries. The
average level of educational attainment is an external factor into the production function,
that raises the productivity of labor, and more importantly, capital. As a result, capital
ﬂows, though equalize the rates of return to capital, fall short of equalizing the capita-
labor ratio. Therefore, wages (per eﬃciency units) are not equalized. Labor of all skill
levels has still strong incentives to migrate from poor to rich countries.
In this paper we provide yet another reconciliation of Lucas’ paradox, based on ﬁxed
setup costs of new investments. With such costs, it does not pay a ﬁrm to make a
“small” investment, even though such an investment is called for by marginal productivity
conditions (that is, the standard ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization). Put it
1Note also that despite the expansion of international trade in goods, still the Stolper-Samuelson
(1941) factor price equalization theorem does not manage to eliminate the wage gap.
2diﬀerently, the ﬁrm’s investment decision is twofold now: marginal productivity conditions
determine how much to invest, whereas a “participation” condition determines whether
to invest at all. In such a framework, the Lucas paradox can be reconciled: rates of
return to capital are equalized and concomitantly the wage gap remains in force.
When one looks at data on gross international capital ﬂows of foreign direct investment
(FDI), one is immediately struck by the lack of ﬂows from many rich countries to many
host countries. We looked at data on bilateral FDI ﬂows in a sample of 45 countries,
both developing and developed, over the period of years from 1981 to 1998. Out of 45 x
44 = 1980 source-host pairs of countries with potential bilateral FDI ﬂows, we found that
the number of pairs with actual ﬂows is only 334! There were only 12 countries that made
any FDI export over that period and most of these countries exported FDI to only one
other country. These crude ﬁndings provide a prima facia suggestion for the existence
of ﬁxed setup costs of investment that nullify the potential of “small” capital ﬂows that
may have been called for by marginal productivity conditions.
We emphasize again that whether a cell of s−h pair becomes active or inactive and how
much ﬂow is recorded in this cell in case it becomes active are jointly and simultaneously
determined. Thus, the selection of pairs of countries into active and inactive cells is not
exogenous. If one treats this selection as exogenous, the estimates of the determinants
of FDI ﬂows are biased. We therefore employ a Heckman selection-bias method in order
to simultaneously estimate the determinants of FDI ﬂows and the selection of countries
into pairs of s − h countries.2
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the way Lucas reconciles
the paradox of the inadequacy of capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries. Section 3
presents our model of ﬁxed setup costs of investment. This model is used in Section
4 to provide an alternative reconciliation of Lucas’ paradox. Section 5 presents the
econometric approach. The data are described in Section 6. A crude examination of
the potential for selection bias in the data is done in Section 7. Simultaneous estimation
results of the determinants of FDI ﬂows and whether they are formed at all are presented
2See Heckman (1979).
3in Section 8. The results are interpreted and conclusions are drawn in Section 9. Section
10 concludes.
2 Lucas’ Reconciliation of the Paradox
The law of diminishing returns implies that the marginal product of capital is high in poor
countries and low in rich countries. Therefore, capital should ﬂow from rich to the poor
countries. But, it is hard to account in reality for any signiﬁcant income-equalizing capital
ﬂows. Addressing the question: “Why doesn’t capital ﬂow from rich to poor countries?”,
Lucas (1990) employs a standard constant-returns-to-scale production function:
Y = AF(K,L), (1)
where Y is output, K is capital and L is eﬀective l a b o r . T h el a t t e ri su s e di no r d e r
to allow for diﬀerences in the human capital content of labor between developed and
developing countries. The parameter A is a productivity index which may reﬂect the
average level of human capital in the country, external to the ﬁrm as in Lucas (1990). In
addition, A may reﬂect the stock of public capital (roads and other infrastructure) that
is external to the ﬁrm. In per eﬀective-labor terms, we have:
y ≡ Y/L= AF(K/L,1) ≡ Af(k). (2)
The return to capital is:
r = Af
0(k), (3)
whereas the wage per eﬀective unit of labor is:
w = A[f(k) − kf
0(k)]. (4)
Let a variable with an asterisk (∗) stand for a rich (developed) country and a variable
without an asterisk for a poor (developing) country. The function f is common to all
4countries. Initially, r∗
0 <r 0. But when capital can freely move from rich to poor countries,







Lucas (1990) essentially assumes that A∗ >A(because of a human-capital externality).
Hence, it follows from equation (5) that k∗ >k(because of a diminishing marginal product
of capital). Therefore, employing equation (4) it follows that w∗ > ω.
That is, at equilibrium, workers can earn higher wages (per eﬀective labor) in the
rich country than in the poor country, and administrative means (migration quotas) are
employed to impede the ﬂow of labor from poor to rich countries. Yet there is no pressure
on capital to ﬂow in the opposite direction because rates-of-return on capital are equalized.
Note that with A = A∗, one cannot explain the puzzle posed by Lucas (1990), which is
the existence of a pressure on labor to move from poor countries to rich countries without
the existence at the same time of a pressure on capital to ﬂow in the opposite direction.
The next section provides another explanation for this puzzle.
3 Lumpy Adjustment Cost of Investment
We employ a “lumpy” adjustment cost for new investment, in the form of a ﬁxed setup
cost of investment. This speciﬁcation, which has been recently supported empirically by
Caballero and Engel (1999, 2000), creates economies of scale in investment.3
Consider a two-period economy with a single, all-purpose good. In the ﬁrst period
there exists a continuum of N ﬁrms which diﬀer from each other by a productivity index
ε. We denote a ﬁrm which has a productivity index of ε by an ε−ﬁrm. The cumulative
distribution function of ε is denoted by G(·), with a density function g(·).
3Economies of scale either in the production or investment technologies are also a key contributor to
the gains from trade and economic integration. For example, based on estimates taken from a partial equi-
librium analysis, the Cecchini (1988) Report assessed that the gains from taking advantage of economies
of scale will constitute about 30 percent of the total gains from the European market integration in 1992.
5We denote the initial net capital stock of each ﬁrm by (1−δ)K0. This consists of the net
initial stock, K0, of the preceding period, multiplied by one minus the depreciation rate, δ.
If an ε−ﬁrm invests I in the ﬁrst period, it augments its capital stock to K =( 1 −δ)K0+I
and its gross output in the second period will be AF(K,L)(1 + ε), where L is the labor
input (in eﬀective units). Naturally, ε ≥− 1 so that G(−1) = 0.
We assume that there exists a ﬁxed setup cost of investment, C, which is the same for
all ﬁrms (that is, independent of ε). If an ε−ﬁrm invests in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da na m o u n t
I = K−(1−δ)K0 in order to augment its stock of capital to K, its present value becomes:
V
+(ε;K,L)=
F(K,L)(1 + ε) − wL+( 1− δ)K
1+r
− [K − (1 − δ)K0 + C].
This ﬁrm chooses K and L in order to maximize its value. The ﬁrst-order conditions
FK(K,L)(1 + ε)=r + δ (6)
and
FL(K,L)(1 + ε)=w (7)
deﬁne the optimal K and L for an ε−ﬁrm, if it chooses to make a new investment at
all. These are denoted by K+(ε;w,r) and L+(ε;w,r), respectively. Note, however, that
an ε−ﬁrm may chose not to invest at all [that is, to stick to its existing stock of capital
(1 − δ)K0)] and avoid the setup lumpy cost C. In this case its labor input, denoted by
L−(ε;K0;w,r) is deﬁned by:
FL[(1 − δ)K0,L](1 + ε)=w. (8)
Note that L− depends on the initial stock of capital. Naturally, low ε−ﬁrms may not ﬁnd








6Therefore, there exists a cutoﬀ level of ε, denoted by ε0, such that an ε−ﬁrm will make a
new investment if and only if ε > ε0. This cutoﬀ level of ε depends on K0,wand r. We














We continue to assume that labor is conﬁned within national borders. Denoting the










+(ε;w,r)g(ε)dε = ˜ L0,









where L0 ≡ ˜ L0/N is the eﬀective labor per ﬁrm.
Note that no similar market clearance equation is speciﬁed for capital, as we continue
to assume that capital is freely mobile internationally and its rate of return is equalized
internationally.
We look at FDI ﬂows in this paper because:
(i) This form of international ﬂow is assuming a dominant role among all other forms
of international ﬂows in recent years, and it is the most stable among international capital
ﬂows; (ii) Fixed setup costs are most pronounced in the case of FDI.
4 An Alternative Reconciliation of the Paradox
L e tu sf o c u so nt h ei n t e r n a t i o n a ld i ﬀerences in the abundance of eﬀective labor relative
to the number of ﬁrms, that is, L0. We therefore assume at this stage that K0 = K∗
0 and
7C = C∗. Naturally, eﬀective labor per ﬁrm is more abundant in the developing country.
That is, we assume that:
˜ L0/N ≡ L0 >L
∗




We demonstrate that in this case that even though r = r∗ (by the capital mobility
assumption), we nevertheless have w<ω∗. That is, labor wishes to migrate from poor to
rich countries even though capital moves freely from rich to poor countries.
To see this, suppose, on the contrary, that w = w∗. Then the demand for eﬀective





















Hence, the demand for eﬀective labor (per ﬁrm) is the same in both countries. There-
fore, this cannot be an equilibrium because the supply of eﬀective labor (per ﬁrm) is
higher in the poor country. Thus, at equilibrium, the wage per eﬀective unit of labor
must be lower in the poor country than in the rich country.
It also follows that the higher wage in the rich country reduces the proﬁt from invest-






(Recall that K0 = K∗
0 and r = r∗.)
8I nf a c t ,t h ew a g ed i ﬀerential must be high enough so as to push ε0(K∗
0;w∗,r ∗) all the
way to the upper bound ¯ ε.4 That is, no ﬁrm in the rich country makes new investment. To
see this, note that for the investing ﬁrms, the capital-labor ratio is governed by equation
(6). (Recall that with constant returns-to-scale, FK depends on K/L only). Thus, with
r = r∗, the capital-labor ratio for the investing ε−ﬁrm must be the same in both countries.
But then equation (7) implies that the wage (per an eﬀective unit of labor) must be the
same in both countries, in contradiction to our conclusion that w<w ∗.
To complete the picture, we brieﬂy discuss also international diﬀerences in the setup
cost (C). It is plausible that the setup cost is higher in poor countries than in rich countries.
This is because the setup cost may reﬂect the level of public capital (transportation
infrastructure, communication infrastructure, etc.) and the average level of human capital
[as in Lucas (1990)]. The higher setup cost in the poor country induces fewer ﬁrms to
make new investment (that is ε0 shifts to the right). This exerts a further pressure down
on wages in poor countries (and attracts less capital from rich countries).
Consider now the possibility of establishing a new ﬁrm. Suppose that the newcomer
entrepreneur does not know in advance the productivity factor (ε) of the potential ﬁrm.
She therefore takes G(·) as the probability distribution of the productivity factor of the
new ﬁrm. The expected value of the new ﬁrm is therefore the maximized value (over K
and L) of:








F(K,L)(1 + ε) − wL+( 1− δ)K
1+r





where C is the setup cost of establishing a new ﬁrm and that ε is revealed to the ﬁrm
before it decide whether or not to make new investment. The lower wage (per eﬀective
labor) in the poor country makes the expected value of a new ﬁrm higher. Therefore:
¯ V (w
∗,r
∗) < ¯ V (w,r).
4Evidently, if capital mobility is not as perfect as in the model, the rich country will continue to make
new investment (that is, ε∗
0 < ¯ ε).
9(Recall that r = r∗.) Thus, the poor country attracts more new ﬁrms. Assuming that
newcomer entrepreneurs evolve gradually over time, eventually this process may end up
with full factor price equalization. Naturally, the capital-labor ratios and L ≡ ˜ L/N
are equalized in this long-run steady state. All this happens even though labor is not
internationally mobile. The establishment of new ﬁrms in the global economy may be
an engine for FDI ﬂows by multinationals, due to setup-cost advantage over domestic
investors in the host country.
Generally speaking, ﬁrms will enter so that in the long-run equilibrium the number of
workers per ﬁrm will be the same in both countries, and so will be the capital stock per
worker. During the transition to this long-run equilibrium, wages remain unequal and
FDI ﬂows from the rich country to the poor country.
Our two-country model, which generates capital ﬂows from the rich to the poor coun-
try, can be exstened in two ways. First, by assuming more than one industry, each country
may have a setup-cost advantage in a diﬀerent industry. Concequantly, we can have two-
way FDI ﬂows. Second, we may also consider an n-country model which gives rise to
n(n − 1) potential bilateral ﬂows.5
5 The Econometric Approach
The proceeding section presents a model of capital mobility distinguished by setup costs
of investment. In the model an important vehicle, through which capital ﬂows from one
country to another, is foreign direct investment (hereafter: FDI), taking place either in
order to acquire existing ﬁrms and investing in them (Mergers and Acquisitions FDI), or
to establish new ﬁrms (Greenﬁeld Investment FDI). Our empirical investigation is in the
5Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) pose the question of how a source country can simultaneously
make both FDI and exports to the same host country. Their answer rests on productivity heterogeneity
within the source country, and diﬀerences in the setup costs associated with FDI and exports. Their
explanation is thus geared toward ﬁrm-level decisions on exports and FDI in the source country.
10tradition of the often used gravity models,6 with our adjustments for a selection bias into
source and host countries. With n countries in the sample, there are potentially n(n−1)
pairs of source-host (s−h) countries. In fact, as we show in the data section below, that
the actual number of s−h pairs is much smaller, less than thirty percent of the potential
number. Therefore, the selection into s−h pairs, which is naturally endogenous,c a n n o t
be ignored; that is, this selection cannot be taken as exogenous, which is the standard
practice in most gravity models.
Denote by Yi,j,t the ﬂow of FDI from source country i to host country j in period t.
FDI ﬂows from source country j to host country i are denoted by Yj,i,t. Note that with
this notation, Yi,j,t is always non-negative. But, it may well be zero, because typically,
in a global economy, there are only a few countries which signiﬁcantly export FDI.
The existence of a setup cost of investment makes investment “lumpy”. This means
that the conventional determinants of FDI ﬂows (such as rate of returns diﬀerentials)
have to be strong enough in order to generate a large FDI ﬂow that surpasses a certain
threshold. Otherwise, the observed FDI ﬂow is practically zero. We argue that the sub-
sample of FDI source countries is not a random sample of the countries global economy,
if setup costs play a signiﬁcant role in the determination of FDI ﬂows. We now develop
a simple econometric approach to study the eﬀect of setup costs and correct for selection
bias in the analysis of FDI ﬂows.7
6Gravity models postulate that bilateral international ﬂows (goods, FDI, etc.) between any two
economies are positively related to the size of the two economies (e.g., population, GDP), and negatively
to the distance (physical or other such as tariﬀ barriers, information asymmetries, etc.) between them.
For instance, using population as the size variable, Loungani, Mody and Razin (2002) ﬁnd that imports
are less than proportionately related to the host country population, while they are close to propor-
tionately related to the source country population. Correspondingly, FDI ﬂows increase by more than
proportionately with both the source and the host-country populations.
7Correction for selection bias is rare in international economics literature. A notable exposition is
Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2003) who applied the Heckman selection model in estimating the
average maturity of sovereign debt. They take into account the incidental truncation of the data, since
the average maturity is available only for countries which issue bonds to the world market. The missing
observations cannot be treated as zero maturity. They show, as expected, that countries with weak macro
115.1 FDI Flows and the “Participation" Equation
To simplify, but without losing generality, let us assume that, in a world with no setup
costs, potential FDI ﬂows exhibit the following linear form:
Yi,j,t = Xi,j,tβ + Ui,j,t, (14)
where Xi,j,t stands for a vector of observed variables, such as per-capita income diﬀerentials
between country i and country j (reﬂecting diﬀerences in the capital-labor ratio) that
potentially can explain the pattern of FDI ﬂows, excluding the eﬀect of setup costs. The
vector β is the ceteris paribus eﬀect of Xi,j,t on Yj,i,t. The error term Ui,j,t, is a composite
of (i) an unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity factor (θi,j), and (ii) a i.i.d. random




,r e ﬂecting ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic
policy, political events, etc., that are unique to the i-j pair. That is:
Ui,j,t = θi,j + ηi,j,t, (15)
Let Zi,j,t be a latent variable, indicating the maximized proﬁt( h e r e a f t e r :π)f r o mt h e
direct investment made in host country j,b yaﬁrm in the source country i,in period t.
Following our model we allow Zi,j,t to be determined by setup costs (Ci,j + ci,j,t),




. Note that the setup costs consist of two elements: (a)
time- invariant costs (Ci,j),r e ﬂecting persistent features of the i−j pair, such as language,
geographical distance etc., and (b) time-variant setup costs (ci,j,t), such as communication
and transportation costs. We assume that the vector Zi,j,t, as a function of Xi,j,t,e x h i b i t s
the following linear form:
Zi,j,t = Xi,j,tα + Vi,j,t, (16)
where the vector α is the ceteris paribus eﬀect of Xi,j,t on Zi,j,t. N o t et h a ti nt h ec a s e
where Xi,j,t aﬀects the value of maximized proﬁt, the same way as it inﬂuences Yi,j,t in
equation (??), then α = β. The error term Vi,j,t , in the proﬁt equation, is a composite of
economic stance are less likely to issue bonds. In this case the problem reduces to be the standard Tobin
model.
12(i) the unobserved setup costs (Ci,j + ci,j,t) and (ii) the pairwise-speciﬁc π shocks (νi,j,t):
Vi,j,t = −Ci,j (θi,j)+νi,j,t, (17)
where νi,j,t = ηi,j,t − ci,j,t. We further assume that, for a random sample, the classical
assumptions regarding the error term do hold. In particular, we assume that:8
E (Ui,j,t | Xi,j,t)=E (Ui,j,t)=0 (18)
and
E (Vi,j,t | Xi,j,t)=E (Vi,j,t)=0
It follows from equation (??) and equation (??) that:
cov (Ui,j,t,V i,j,t) > 0. (19)












Note that whereas Zi,j,t is not observed, the binary variable Di,j,t is indeed observed .
The fundamental parameters of interest in our analysis are β and Ci,j.
5.2 Setup Costs and Selection Bias
The population regression function for Equation (??) is:
E (Yi,j,t | Xi,j,t)=Xi,j,tβ (21)
Many previous studies aimed at estimating the eﬀects of X on Y in the context of
international capital mobility (and also, similarly, in the context of goods mobility through
international trade) typically ignore the eﬀect of unobserved setup costs on the observed
capital ﬂows. However, the regression function for the sub-sample of countries, for which
we do indeed observe positive FDI ﬂo w si s:
E (Yi,j,t | Xi,j,t,D i,j,t =1 )=Xi,j,tβ + E (Ui,j,t | Xi,j,t,D i,j,t =1 ) (22)
8At this stage we ignore serial correlation in the error terms.
13Note that the last term is no longer equal to zero. Furthermore, the term E (Ui,j,t | Xi,j,t,D i,j,t =1 ) depend
on Xi,j,t, unlike the classical assumptions concerning regression functions applied to ran-
dom samples.
To see this more clearly, one can substitute equations (??) and (??)into (??), to get:
E (Yi,j,t | Xi,j,t,D i,j,t =1 )=Xi,j,tβ+E [(θi,j + εi,j,t) | Xi,j,t, (−Ci,j − ci,j,t + εi,j,t) > −Xi,j,tα]
(23)
Now, one can verify directly from Equation (??) that the OLS estimator for β is indeed
biased.
Figure 1 provides the intuition. Suppose, for instance, that Xi,j,t measures the per-
capita income diﬀerential between the ith source country and the jth potential host coun-
try, holding all other variables constant, namely per-capita income diﬀerentials between
the ith source country and all the rest of the countries. Our theory predicts that parame-
ter β is positive in this case. This is shown by the upward sloping line AB. Note that this
slope is an estimate of the “true” underlying eﬀect of Xi,j,t on Yi,j,t. But, recall that ﬂows
could be equal to zero if the set up cost are suﬃciently high. The capital-ﬂow threshold
derived from the setup costs is shown as line TT’ in Figure 1.
However, recall that the data include only those country pairs for which Yi,j,t is positive.
This sub-sample is, therefore, no longer random . Moreover, as Equation (??) makes clear
the selection of country pairs into this sub-sample depends on the vector Xi,j,t.
To see this, suppose, for instance, that for high values of Xi,j,t (the speciﬁcl e v e lXH in
Figure 1) i-j pair-wise FDI ﬂows are all positive. That is, for all pairs of countries potential
Yi,j,t are higher than the threshold line. Thus, the observed average, for Xi,j,t = XH is
also equal to the conditional population average, point R on the line AB. However, this
does not hold for low values of Xi,j,t (denoted by XL). For those i-j pairs we observe
positive values of Yi,j,t only in a non-random sample of the population. For instance,
point S is excluded from the observed sub-sample of positive FDI ﬂows. consequently, as
predicted by our model, we observe only those with low setup cost (namely high Vi,j,t),
among those with low Xi,j,t .As seen in Figure 1, the observed conditional average is at
point M
0, which lies above point M. The sub-sample OLS regression line is shown by the
14line A
0B
0 , which understates the inﬂuence of the income per capita diﬀerentials on the
ﬂows of FDI.
To overcome the selection bias we employ a variation of the standard Heckman’s
selection model (Heckman (1979)) extended to the analysis of panel data (Kyriazidou
(1996)). In the ﬁrst stage we use a Probit analysis to estimate the Participation Equation,
namely the likelihood of having positive FDI ﬂows in our sample. In the second stage,
we use estimates of unobserved set up costs are used to correct for selection bias in the
estimates of the eﬀect of the per-capita income diﬀerentials on FDI ﬂows.
As standard in the literature, we assume that the i-j pairwise-speciﬁc errors (νi,j,t) in






Then, the probability of surpassing the FDI-ﬂow threshold (for the Probit) exhibits the
following form:











We estimate Equation (??) by controlling for ﬁxed-eﬀects. Finally, the vector of estimated
ﬁxed-eﬀects (δi,j), from the Probit model, yields an unbiased estimator vector for the
time-invariant element of the setup costs (Ci,j). Having these estimates, we get unbiased
estimates of β,a sw e l l .
Figure 2 provides an intuition for our econometric strategy to back up estimates for
the time invariant setup costs. On the horizontal axis we plot the error term in the π
equation (νi,j,t − Xi,j,tα). According to our model, there is a positive FDI ﬂow from a
source country i to a host country j, if and only if, Xi,j,tα − Ci,j − νi,j,t > 0. For both
high and low values of Ci,j , there is a positive probability of observing FDI ﬂows from












15assuming that the stochastic properties of νi,j,t d on o tv a r yo v e rt i m e(i np a r t i c u l a rn o
serial correlation), it follows that the frequency of positive FDI ﬂows between country pairs
associated with CH
i,j is lower than the corresponding frequency associated with country
pairs with CM
i,j. Therefore, there exists a mapping from Ci,j to the average Di,j,t (average
over t) which can be used for estimating the time-invariant setup costs.
Summing up, our econometric approach yields unbiased estimates of two classes of
determinants of FDI ﬂows: (1) the eﬀect of income per-capita diﬀerentials on FDI ﬂows,
and (2) the eﬀect of setup costs on FDI ﬂows.
6D a t a
Our data is drawn from a sample of 45 countries, both developing and developed countries,
over the period from 1961 to 1998. The data on FDI ﬂows are for the period from 1981 to
1998 only. The FDI data are based on the OECD reports of FDI exports from 12 OECD
source countries to 45 OECD and non-OECD countries. To the best of our knowledge,
the only countries in our sample which do exports FDI but we miss these data are Taiwan
and Hong-Kong. We handle this issue in section 9.
We employ 3-year averages, so that we have six periods (each consisting of 3 years).
The main variables we employ are: (1) standard country characteristics such as GDP or
GDP per-capita, population, educational attainment, geographical longitude and altitude,
language, road length per country’s area, telephone lines per-capita, etc.; (2) s−h pair data
such as s−h FDI ﬂows, geographical distance, common language (zero-one variable), s−h
ﬂows of goods, bilateral telephone traﬃc, etc. The appendix provides more information
on the data: Table A1 describes the list of the 45 countries in the sample and whether
observed in the sample (at least once) as a source or host country; Table A2 describes the
sources for our data. It is worth emphasizing again that though we have 45 countries in
t h es a m p l ea n dp o t e n t i a l l y4 5x4 4=1 9 8 0s − h pairs (for each of the six periods in the
sample), there are only 540 s − h pairs (12 source countries and 45 host countries) with
positive ﬂows.
167 A First Look at the Selection Bias Problem in the
Data
As was already pointed out, the selection of countries into s − h pairs is a key feature in
the data. Out of 1980 potential s − h pairs, we observe only 540 s − h pairs in the data
over a long period of years from 1981 - 1998. Therefore, in this section we take a ﬁrst
look into the s − h selection pattern.
Consider ﬁrst the sample of actual observations consisting of 540 s−h pairs, 12 source
and 45 host countries. This sample exhibits an asymmetry in the (relatively small)
number of source countries and (relatively large) number of host countries. Moreover,
in this self-selected sample, not every source country exports FDI to all host countries.
Do all host countries import FDI from all source countries? This question is answered
in Figure 3, which depict the fraction of host countries that import FDI from x source
countries, x =1 ,2,...,12. If the answer is in the positive, then we should ﬁnd just one
column equalling 45 for x =1 2a n da l lo t h e r1 1c o l u m n sb e i n go fz e r oh e i g h t . B u ta s
Figure 3 suggests, only 9 of the 45 host countries import FDI from all 12 source countries.
Similarly, Figure 4 depicts the fraction of source countries that export FDI to x host
countries, x =0 ,1,...,45.T h e ﬁgure suggests that no source country exports FDI to all
host countries. Furthermore, most source countries export to just one host country.
Given the selection of source and host countries, we next examine whether the number
of host countries each source country exports to and similarly the number of source
countries each host country imports from are random or depend on country characteristics.
Figure 5 illustrates the role of GDP per capita in host countries. The 45 host countries are
classiﬁed into (at most) twelve groups along the vertical axis, according to the number of
source countries from which they import FDI. For each such group of host countries, the
average GDP per-capita is depicted along the horizontal axis. The ﬁgure shows that the
higher the per-capita GDP in a host country, the larger is the number of source countries
it imports from. A similar pattern is found with respect to educational attainment: the
higher the level of educational attainment in a host country, the larger is the number of
17source countries it imports from; see Figure 6. No such pattern is found with respect to
the characteristics of the source countries. The twelve source countries are classiﬁed into
(at most) 12 categories, according to the number of host countries they export to. (Each
category is a number between 1 and 45.) The average GDP per-capita and the average
educational attainment of the source countries in that category does not seem to aﬀect
the number of host countries in each category; see Figure 7 and 8.
8 Estimation
The dependent variable in all the gravity equations is the log of the FDI ﬂows, deﬂated
by unit value of manufactured exports.
As a benchmark, we simply estimate the gravity equation (??) a si s .T h a ti s :( 1 )w e
employ only actually observed s−h pairs, namely we employ the subset of 540 pairs (for
each of the six periods in the sample); (2) we ignore the “participation” equation (25)
which explains the endogenous selection of s − h matches, namely “zeros” were inserted
into the no-ﬂow cells among the 540 cells. The rationale for inserting “zeros” is as follows.
Generally, when one observes no FDI ﬂows between a pair of countries, it could be either
because the two countries do not wish to have such ﬂows even in the absence of ﬁxed cost
or because setup costs are prohibitive for low ﬂows. But in the benchmark case which
ignores setup costs, cells with no FDI ﬂows “truly” indicate zero ﬂows. This is why we
assume a one-dollar value (with the log equalling zero) as a common low value for the
value of the FDI ﬂows in the no-ﬂow cells. (All other positive ﬂows have logarithmic value
much exceeding zero.9)
The estimation results for this benchmark case are described in panel A of Table 1.
We make three alternative speciﬁcations (I, II, III). The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two
speciﬁc a t i o n si st h a tt h eﬁrst one has GDP as one of the size (gravity) variables, whereas
in the second one population is the size variable. Speciﬁcation II includes also GDP
9We performed robustness tests by replacing the zeros by large negative numbers. The conclusions
are not meaningfully changed.
18per-capita as an explanatory variable. Two ﬁndings clearly emerge: ﬁrst, the coeﬃcients
(elasticities) of the GDP variable (in the ﬁrst speciﬁc a t i o n )i nb o t ht h eh o s ta n ds o u r c e
country and the GDP per-capita (in the second speciﬁcation) in both the host and source
country are positive and signiﬁcant. Second, the elasticity is signiﬁcantly larger for the
source country. We also ﬁnd that countries that share a common language has signiﬁ-
cantly more (50%) FDI ﬂows between them than countries that do not share a common
language. Likewise, the coeﬃcient of distance is negative and signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcation
III employs source/host ratios of GDP per-capita, population and educational attainment.
Contrary to the premise that capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries, the coeﬃcient of
GDP per-capita ratio is negative and very signiﬁcant with this speciﬁcation. Likewise,
contrary to Lucas’ explanation, the coeﬃcient of the ratio of educational attainment is
insigniﬁcant.
The benchmark case treats the selection of the 540 s − h pairs as exogeneous.T h a t
i s ,i ti g n o r e st h ef a c tt h a t3 3c o u n t r i e si nt h es a m p l eo f4 5c o u n t r i e sm a yh a v en o tc h o s e n
to export FDI because of economic factors. In addition, the benchmark case ignores the
role that setup costs may have played in generating no-ﬂow pairs: both by reducing the
number of source countries to 12, and by causing some zero ﬂows from the remaining 12
countries. We now study in two stages the role of setup costs in the sample selection
of countries into s − h pairs. We ﬁrst expand the sample to include all 1980 potential
s − h pairs. At this stage, we still ignore setup costs and insert a low common value for
t h el o go ft h eF D Iﬂow (namely, zero) in the no-ﬂow cells. The ﬁndings are presented
in panel B of Table 1. The characteristics of the host countries drastically lose their
explanatory power. For example, the elasticity of FDI with respect to GDP in the
host country (Speciﬁcation I) drops from 0.727 to 0.207. Likewise, the coeﬃcient of the
variable of educational attainment in the host country drops from 0.153 to 0.045. The
relevance of the source country characteristics declines too but not as much as that of the
host country characteristics. Therefore, the source country characteristics become more
important relatively to the host country characteristics. FDI ﬂows between countries
with a common language, which were 50% more than between other countries in the
19benchmark case, are now only 22% higher. Similar ﬁndings are found in Speciﬁcation
III.
This ﬁrst stage corrects the anomaly found in the benchmark case in Speciﬁcation III:
now the coeﬃcient of source-host GDP per-capita ratio is positive and signiﬁcant; namely,
capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries. In addition, the source-host educational attain-
ment ratio becomes signiﬁcantly positive in line with Lucas’ hypothesis. Nevertheless,
the coeﬃcient of the common language variable is paradoxically negative and signiﬁcant.
Finally, the complete picture and especially the role played by the unobserved setup
costs are brought to the limelights in the second stage. We do this by jointly estimating
the maximum likelihood of the gravity equation (14) for the full sample of 1980 s−h pairs
and the participation equation (25), which arises because of the existence of setup costs.
The unbiased estimates of the coeﬃcients of the gravity equation are presented in panel
A of Table 2. The coeﬃcient of GDP per-capita of the source country (Speciﬁcation
II), which was positive and signiﬁcant both in the benchmark case and in the ﬁrst stage,
becomes now in the full economic model negligible and insigniﬁcant. On the other hand,
the eﬀect of the level of educational attainment in the source country is now twice as
l a r g ea si ne i t h e rt h eb e n c h m a r kc a s eo rt h eﬁrst stage. Likewise, the magnitude of the
eﬀect of common language more than doubles relative to either the benchmark case or
the ﬁr s ts t a g e . As i m i l a ri n c r e a s ei so b s e r v e df o rt h ed i s t a n c ev a r i a b l e . T h ee ﬀect of the
source-host GDP per-capita ratio (Speciﬁcation III) disappears now, whereas the eﬀect
of the source-host educational attainment ratio tripled in size.
The estimation results for the participation equation are reported in panel B of Table
2. Unlike in the gravity equation, the magnitude of the eﬀect of GDP per-capita in
the source country (Speciﬁcation II) is now almost ten times as high as that of the host
country. Furthermore, the eﬀect of the educational attainment in the source country is
barely signiﬁcant. Also, the common language variable is insigniﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient
o ft h ed i s t a n c ev a r i a b l ei sn e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant. Notice that the correlation between
the error terms in the gravity and participation equations (ρ)i sn e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant.
This means that if the actual probability of a pair of countries to be a source-host pair is
20larger than what is predicted for this pair by the participation equation, then the actual
FDI ﬂow between this pair of countries is smaller than what is predicted by the gravity
equation.
9 Robustness for some missing FDI export data
So far our results are derived from the full sample of countries. As we have already pointed
out, the FDI data are based on the OECD reports of FDI exports from 12 OECD source
c o u n t r i e st o4 5O E C Da n dn o n - O E C Dc o u n t r i e s .T h ef a c tt h a to n l y1 2c o u n t r i e si no u r
s a m p l es e r v ea ss o u r c ef o rF D Ie x p o r tm a yr e ﬂect miss-reporting problems rather than
zero FDI exports.
To guard against the possibility that the results presented in section 9 reﬂect miss-
reporting we re-estimate the model using the sub-sample of only the countries for which
we have FDI export data. This sub-sample contains 12 OECD FDI exporting countries.
We report our ﬁndings in Table 3 and Table 4. As both tables make clear, our ﬁndings,
concerning the role of country characteristics and h − s pair characteristics, in both the
gravity and the participation equation, hold for this sub-sample as well.
10 Interpretation
The ﬁnding that there is a signiﬁcant correlation (ρ ) between the error terms in the gravity
and participation equations indicates that the formation of an s−h pair of countries and
t h es i z eo ft h eF D Iﬂow between this pair of countries are not independent processes.
Furthermore, being negative, this correlation is consistent with the hypothesis of setup
costs of investment. If the setup cost of forming a certain s − h pair of countries is
high, it is less likely for one to observe the formation of this pair. The error term
in the participation equation is thus negative. But then the error term in the gravity
equation is positive. The unobserved heterogeneity in the gravity equation is aﬀected
only by the marginal productivity of capital. However, the unobserved heterogeneity in
21the participation equation is aﬀected both by the marginal productivity of capital and
b yt h es e t u pc o s t so fi n v e s t m e n t .T h en e g a t i v ec o r r e l a t i o ni m p l i e st h a ts o u r c ec o u n t r i e s
with low setup costs (and, therefore, with positive "errors" in the participation equation)
are also source countries with high marginal productivity of capital (and, therefore, with
negative "errors" in the gravity equation). Indeed, when we control for source and host
country ﬁxed-eﬀect, the error terms turn to be positively correlated. In other words, once
the invariant unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account we ﬁn dt h em o r eac o u n t r y
is likely to become a source for FDI exports, the more FDI exports do ﬂow from this
country.
The benchmark case, which ignores the self-selection problem, provides no evidence
for the commonly held view that capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries, because the
elasticity of FDI ﬂow with respect to GDP per-capita in the host country was at least
as high as that in the source country. Also, the benchmark case provides no evidence
for Lucas hypothesis. In one case (Speciﬁcation I and II) the elasticity of FDI ﬂow with
respect to educational attainment in the source country was positive and about equal to
that in the host country. (Lucas’ hypothesis suggests that this elasticity should be negative
for the source country and positive for the host country). In another case (Speciﬁcation
III), the coeﬃcient of the ratio of source-host educational attainment was not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. After correcting for the selection bias in the benchmark case, the
coeﬃcient of the ratio of source-host educational attainment (Speciﬁcation III) is positive
and signiﬁcant.
If education, as measured by the average years of schooling is indeed a “good" measure
for cross-countries diﬀerences in human capital then these ﬁndings are consistent with
Lucas’ hypothesis, however in a subtle way. On the one hand, in agreement with the
Lucas’ hypothesis, the higher the average years of schooling in a host country is, the more
FDI exports ﬂow into this country. On the other hand, it is worth noticing the it does not
hold for the direction of trade. The higher the average years of schooling in a (potential)
source country is the more likely this country is to export FDI ﬂows. Hence, while FDI
exports ﬂow from educated into less educated countries, the higher the education level is
22t h em o r eF D Ie x p o r t sﬂow into the host countries.
11 Conclusion
The existence of setup costs of investment presents the ﬁrm with a twofold investment
decision: whether to invest at all and how much to invest. Therefore, we estimate jointly
a participation equation (the decision whether to invest at all) and a gravity equation
(the decision how much to invest). We ﬁnd that the error terms in these two equations
are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated. The negative correlation suggests that source
countries with relatively low setup costs are also those with high marginal productivity
of capital. Indeed, controlling for source and host countries ﬁxed (country) eﬀect, the
correlation between these errors terms turns out to be in fact positive. These ﬁndings
provide supportive evidence for the existence and importance of setup costs of investment
and especially to the diﬀerent eﬀects on the FDI ﬂows of the marginal productivity and
the setup costs conditions. We ﬁnd that GDP per-capita diﬀerences between source and
host countries are a signiﬁcant determinant of the decision of whether to invest at all,
but only marginal for the determination of the size of FDI ﬂows. This suggests that
capital does ﬂow from rich to poor countries, but in a more subtle way than what may
be inferred from the marginal productivity conditions. The evidence for the importance
of setup costs of investment, and the subtle way in which the ﬂow of capital from rich to
poor countries, are consistent with our alternative reconciliation of the Lucas’ Paradox.
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* Education is measured by the average number of years of schooling of total population age 25 and older in source (host) country. Source: Barro-LeeTable 1:
The OLS "Gravity" FDI Equation
Dependent variable: FDI (prices adjusted - in logs)
OLS* OLS*^ OLS* OLS*^ OLS* OLS*^
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
GDP of the host country 0.727 0.207
(0.031) (0.012)
GDP of the source country 0.926 0.700
(0.033) (0.012)
GDP per capita - host 0.904 0.270
(0.053) (0.019)
GDP per capita - source 1.656 0.794
(0.169) (0.019)
S-H GDP per capita  -0.514 0.318
(0.053) (0.016)
Average years of schooling - host 0.153 0.045 0.074 0.019
(0.018) (0.007) (0.025) (0.009)
Average years of schooling - source 0.154 0.168 0.123 0.128
(0.026) (0.007) (0.026) (0.009)
S/H avg. school years ratio -0.002 0.092
(0.100) (0.042)
Population - host 0.701 0.199
(0.032) (0.012)
Population - source 0.897 0.686
(0.034) (0.012)
S-H population gap 0.061 0.250
(0.029) (0.010)
Same Language 0.489 0.221 0.564 0.219 0.506 -0.130
(0.089) (0.032) (0.091) (0.032) (0.110) (0.039)
Distance -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 2796 9843 2796 9843 2796 9843
Adj R-square 0.412 0.399 0.419 0.402 0.1074 0.0945
Note:
* Replacing missing values (log(0)) with zeros. (Bechmark case)
^ Including all possible S-H pairs. (Stage one)
All specifications include year fixed-effects.
( ) Standard errors in parenthesis
Specification I Specification II Specification IIITable 2:
The Complete Gravity Model: FDI Flows and Selection into S-H Pairs
The Full Maximum-Likelihood
Variables (i) (ii) (iii)
GDP of the host country^ 0.624
(0.036)
GDP of the source country^ 0.567
(0.072)
GDP per capita - host^ 0.762
(0.054)
GDP per capita - source^ 0.002
(0.207)
S-H GDP per capita gap^ -0.091
(0.100)
Average years of schooling - host 0.151 0.087
(0.016) (0.023)
Average years of schooling - source 0.232 0.295
(0.029) (0.025)
S/H avg. school years ratio 0.298
(0.112)
Population - host^ 0.583
(0.036)
Population - source^ 0.557
(0.059)
S-H population gap^ 0.345
(0.060)
Same Language 1.249 1.209 0.596
(0.082) (0.085) (0.124)
Distance -0.006 -0.006 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel A: Flows Equation: Dependent variable: FDI (prices adjusted - in logs)Table 2:
The Complete Gravity Model: FDI Flows and Selection into S-H Pairs
The Full Maximum-Likelihood
Variables (i) (ii) (iii)
GDP of the host country^ 0.162
(0.016)
GDP of the source country^ 0.755
(0.019)
GDP per capita - host^ 0.264
(0.030)
GDP per capita - source^ 1.928
(0.073)
S-H GDP per capita  gap^ 0.398
(0.015)
Average years of schooling - host 0.029 0.000 0.024
(0.009) (0.014) (0.035)
Average years of schooling - source 0.265 0.058
(0.011) (0.015)
S/H avg. school years ratio 0.000
(0.000)
Population - host^ 0.174
(0.018)
Population - source^ 0.673
(0.020)
S-H population gap^ 0.244
(0.010)
Same Language -0.044 0.024 -0.298
(0.045) (0.049) (0.036)
Distance -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rho -0.501 -0.585 0.657
(0.094) (0.077) (0.082)
sigma 1.580 1.610 2.408
(0.055) (0.056) (0.149)
lambda -0.791 -0.943 1.582
(0.174) (0.154) (0.294)
Observations 9843 9843 9843
Log likelihood -5554.4 -5276.1 -7524.5
Note:
^ in logs
All specifications include year fixed-effects.
( ) Standard errors in parenthesis
Panel B: Selection Equation: Dependent variable: Positive FDI flows (=1)Table A2:   Data Source 
Variables:  Source: 
Import of Goods  Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF 
FDI Inflows  International Direct Investment Database, OECD 
Unit Value of Manufactured Exports  World Economic Outlook, IMF 
Population  International Financial Statistics, IMF 
GDP  World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Distance  Shang Jin Wei’s Website: www.nber.org/~wei 
Bilateral Telephone Traffic  Direction of Traffic: Trends in International 
Telephone Tariffs, International 
Telecommunications Union 
Education Attainment  Burro-Lee Dataset: www.nber.org/N... 
Roads  ….. 
Language  ….. 
Longitude and Altitude  …. 
   
   
  
Table A1:  List of Countries, by Observed Source/Host Status 
  Observed as 
Country  Source
1  Host 
Argentina  +  + 
Australia  +  + 
Austria  +  + 
Belgium    + 
Brazil    + 
Canada  +  + 
Chile    + 
China    + 
Columbia    + 
Denmark    + 
Ecuador    + 
Egypt    + 
Finland    + 
France  +  + 
Germany  +  + 
Greece    + 
Hong Kong    + 
India    + 
Ireland    + 
Israel    + 
Italy  +  + 
Japan  +  + 
Korea    + 
Kuwait    + 
Malaysia    + 
Mexico    + 
Netherlands  +  + 
New Zealand    + 
Nigeria    + 
Norway  +  + 
Peru    + 
Philippines    + 
Portugal    + 
Saudi Arabia    + 
Singapore    + 
South Africa    + 
Spain    + 
Sweden  +  + 
Switzerland    + 
Taiwan    + 
Thailand    + 
Turkey    + United Kingdom  +  + 
United States  +  + 
Venezuala    + 
 
 
1We have information on whether a country is a source country only for OECD countries. 